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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA Mc WILLIAMS, 
MICHAEL Mc WILLIAMS, 
RANDALL McWILLIAMS, 
TIMOTHY McWILLIAMS, 
and LORE McWILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
VS. 
OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY, 
a corporation, and the STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants aud Hespondeats 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 
) 11043 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
)_ 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
Appeal from Order of the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Utah 
THERON E. ROBERTS 
ROBERTS & POOLE 
111 Broadway 
Boise, Idaho 
Attorneys for kppellants 
~·· 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA McWILLIAMS, 
MICHAEL McWILLIAMS, 
RANDALL McWILLIAMS, 
TIMOTHY McWILLIAMS, 
and LORE McWILLIAMS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY, ) 
a corporation, and the ) 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
Def end ants and Respondents,~ 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 
11043 
Comes now BARBARA McWILLIAMS, one of 
the plaintiffs herein, and respectfully petitions this 
Honorable Court for a rehearing in the above entitled 
case. 
This petition is based on the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE COURT IS BASED 
UPON A MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCONCEPTION 
OF THE FACTS. 
POINT II 
THERE IS A TOTAL ABSENCE OF FACTS TO SUP-
- 1-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE MEDICAL PANELS 
AND OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION. 
POINT III 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF 
RES JUDICATA. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT THE 2ND MEDICAL PANEL AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION BASED THEIR DECISION 
IN PART ON THE OPINION OF A DISQUALIFIED 
MEDICAL PANEL. 
ROBERTS AND POOLE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE COURT IS BASED 
UPON A MISUNDERSTANDING AND MIXCONCEPTION 
OF THE FACTS. 
POINT II 
THERE IS A TOTAL ABSENCE OF FACTS TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE MEDICAL PANELS 
AND OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION. 
In the Court's statement of the factual situation 
of this cas~ the following statement is made in the 
opening paragraph of the Majority Opinion: 
"Some seven months after his fall the de-
cedent developed an irregularity in his 
heart beat and had a pacemaker surgi-
-2-
cally implanted in his body ... " 
The facts of this case are that the irregularity in the 
heartbeat first manifested itself immediately after the 
fall as evidenced by the electrocardiogram adminis-
tered to McWilliams on the same day as the fall. 
Prior to the fall there was no evidence of any kind that 
McWilliams had ever suffered from heart malfunction 
or that he had had any of the symptoms of heart dis-
ease. Any conclusions that McWilliams was ill or 
had a heart malfunction of any kind preceding the fall 
has to be based upon pure speculation and must ignore 
the abundance of evidence in the record to the contrary. 
It is apparent from the Panel reports that the doctors 
constituting the medical panel were unable to determine 
the cause of McWilliams' heart disability from a med-
ical standpoint and speculated that he must have had 
pre-existing disability. There are no facts to support 
this conclusion. There is an abundance of facts to 
the contrary. Appellants admit that had the heart 
disease first manifested itself some seven months 
after the fall as set out by the Court in the Majority 
Opinion, that the casual relationship between the fall 
and the heart disease would be open to more serious 
question, but when the heart disease first manifested 
itself immediately after the fall and had never existed 
prior to the fall, it is obvious that the two were con-
nected. Throughout the history of this case from 
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the time of the fall until McWilliams' death, the State 
Insurance Fund never raised the question as to whether 
heart disability was connected with the fall and consis-
tently furnished medical treatment for McWilliams' 
heart condition, even to the extent of the installation 
of the pacemaker. It would appear that the defendant 
had, for a period of many months, acknowledged re-
sponsibility for the heart condition and would be estop-
ped following McWilliams' death from denying such 
responsibility, particularly where the appellants are 
at a decided disadvantage in not being able to have 
available to them McWilliams' testimony as to his phy-
sical condition throughout his lifetime. The crux of 
this case is whether the Industrial Accident Commiss-
ion can ignore the proven facts that McWilliams had no 
pre-existing heart condition and adopt medical opinion 
based upon speculation without factual support. We 
refer the Court to the recent case of Baker v Indus-
trial Commission, 405 P 2d 613, where the Court 
stated as follows: 
"This court is committed to the rule 
that as a matter of law the commission 
may n9t, without any reason or cause, 
arbitrarily and capriciously refuse to 
believe and act upon substantial, com-
petent and credible evidence which is 
uncontradicted. 
"If knowledge of the cause of an ailment, 
-4-
to be shown by the applicant, is a 
condition precedent to an award in 
every case, the letter and spirit of 
the act become quite uninspiring. 
"The dissent says that the critical ques-
tion here is whether the injury occurred 
in the course of applicant's employment. 
We think the critical question here is 
whether the commission arbitrarily can 
dis count all competent, uncontradicted 
evidence. We think it can't but did so 
here, calling for a reversal." 
As the dissenting opinion noted the medical 
testimony offered was purely conjectural on the issue 
of a pre-existing heart ailment. It is a grave injus-
tice under the facts and law of this case for this court 
to stamp approval on the Commission's finding of a 
pre-existing heart condition, and deny the decedents 
widow and her four children compensation when there 
is not one substantial bit of evidence with which it can 
be supported. 
The decedent suffered a violent blow to the head 
when he fell to the pavement on July 22, 1964. Much 
of the controversey between the medical witness for 
the parties involved dealt with whether damage to the 
brain could effect the heart system. Appellants' wit-
nesses maintained such a blow could have positive ill-
effect on the heart function. 
Neither appellants nor her counsel are med-
-5-
ically trained. We and the commission as well are 
dependent on the advise of the medical trained. In 
this connection, admitting that it is contrary to con-
vention, we call the courts attention to a recent news 
release regarding the tragic assassination of Senator 
Robert F. Kennedy. In a diagnostic repcrt upon the 
probable effects of Senator Kennedy's bullet wounds 
to the inner brain, should he have survived, the Amer-
ican Press on June 6, 1968, published the following 
quotation from the eminent neurosurgeons, Henry 
Cuneo. and Lawrence Pool, the men who operated. 
"There was evidently serious damage 
to the cerebellum, the part of the brain 
on the extreme back of head, on the right 
side; also to part of the right cerebal hem-
isphere, and also the mid-brain, which 
is the main cable connecting the brain it-
self with all the rest of the body. 
"This mid-brain deals with not only the 
function of motion in the arms and legs 
and sensation to the body but also with 
eye movements and even the life function 
itself, such as blood pressure, breath-
ing, heart-rate. 
"So, it's a very critical area, and this was 
injured, and this is why I fear- -as Dr. 
Cuneo indicated--the outcome may be ex-
tremeJy tragic." (Emphasis added) 
Nicholson v Industrial Commission, 15 Utah 
2d 176, 389 Pac 2d 730. 
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"In Jones v. California Packing Corpor-
ation, 244 Pac 2d 640, this court recog-
nized the fact that it will not disturb the 
finding or order of the Commission if 
they are supported by any substantial 
evidence. However, it is also recogniz-
ed the duty of this court, particularly with 
reference to a denial of compensation to 
determine whether the commission had 
arbitrarily disregarded competent evidence 
in favor of unsubstantial contradictory 
evidence." 
POINT III 
THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE ISSUE OF 
RES JUDICATA. 
The Court has entirely ignored the issue of 
res judicata and estoppel, and we reiterate our posi-
tion as set out beginning on Page 32 of the Brief pre-
viously filed herein. In this connection we wish to 
point out to the Court that the appellants herein have 
been prejudiced by the position taken by defendant in 
not denying liability for the heart condition during the 
time when McWilliams was alive and could have pre-
sented evidence on his own behalf as to the condition 
of his health preceding the fall and could have sought 
medical examination and research to determine the 
exact cause of the malfunction. The defendant assum-
ed the responsibility of payment for treatment of Mc-
Williams including the heart condition up to the time 
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of the installation of the pacemaker which immediately 
preceded his death, and it is obvious that McWilliams' 
could only have concluded that the defendant acknow-
ledged the heart condition as being an incident of the 
industrial accident. Under these circumstances, 
McWilliams obviously was lulled into a sense of sec-
urity concerning defendant's responsibility for the 
heart condition. Under these circumstances the in-
surance carrier and employer are estopped to deny 
liability. 
Vass' Case, 65 N. E. 2d 549 
"The policy of Workmen's Compensation 
Jurisprudence is not to discourage the 
voluntary payment of compensation and 
medical expenses on the part of an injured 
workman. For this reason, the payment 
by the employer and his insurance carrier 
in itself does not preclude them from deny-
ing liability on the basis of coverage under 
the policy or causation. 
If, however, by continuing the compensa-
tion and medical payments for a period 
of time and workman and his dependents 
are lulled into a sense of security and 
there has been a change of position and 
their rights are prejudiced, the employer 
and his carrier may be estopped in a sub-
sequent proceeding to deny liability." 
Harding vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
28 Pac. 2d 183. 
On the question of estoppel the Court said: 
"Ordinarily in the absence of prejudice 
-8-
to the employee or facts giving rise to 
an estoppel, an insurance carrier may, 
notwithstanding voluntary payment of com-
pensation, the furnishing of hospital or 
medical care, the entry of appearance, or 
statement made that the policy covered 
the employee, ·urge the defense that the 
employee did not meet with an accident, or 
that the policy did not cover the employ-
ment, or that there was no causal con-
nection between the injury and disability. 
(Cases cited). It however, cannot by its 
conduct in paying compensation over a long 
period of time and after either full inves-
tigation or opportunity and time for such 
inquiry, and after the claimant's position 
has changed and rights to which he was 
entitled are lost by lapse of time, and the 
running of statutes of limitations , then 
interpose the defense that the policy of 
insurance did not cover the employee. 
* * * * 
The circumstances are such that the 
State Insurance Fund is now estopped to 
urge that the employee was not within the 
protection of the policy * * * *. " 
With respect to our Brief previously filed in 
this case, we wish to correct the following citations: 
On page 34 of the Brief: 
The correct citation for Hughes Motor Co. v 
Thomas is 299 Pacific 176 
The citation previously 101 C. J. S., Workman's 
Comp., Section 835, should be 99 C.J.S. 203 
On Page 35 of the Brief: 
The citation previously given as 100 C. J. S. , 
-9-
Workman's Comp. Section 401, should be 99 
C.J.S. 190. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT THE 2ND MEDICAL PANEL AND THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION BASED THEIR DECISION 
IN PART ON THE OPINION OF A DISQUALIFIED 
MEDICAL PANEL. 
Appellants objected to Dr. Viko being part of 
the original Medical Panel on this case for the reason 
that he had been instrumental in recommending the 
installation of the pacemaker which immediately pre-
ceded McWilliams' death. While it was not emphasiz-
ed in the Brief previously submitted, it is obvious that 
Dr. Viko might subconsciously lean in favor of the 
party to whom he was looking for his compensation and 
might, by virtue thereof, have had some influence on 
other members of the initial Panel. Also he had some 
responsibility for recommending the treatment that 
immediately preceded McWilliams death. The second 
medical panel and the Industrial Commission as well 
as this court have all based their decision in part on 
the opinions expressed by the disqualified panel. The 
1st panel report should never have been before the 
2nd panel or·relied upon by them. 
In conclusion, it is significant to note that none 
of the doctors on either Medical Panel were able to 
offer any explanation for McWilliams' heart condition 
-10-
other than the purely speculative one that he must 
have had a pre-existing condition. This speculative 
conclusion ignores the abundance of evidence in the 
record negating this conclusion. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERTS & POOLE 
THERON E. ROBERTS 
111 Broadway 
Boise, Idaho 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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